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Competition is one of the most fundamental phenomena in physics, biol-
ogy and economics. Recent studies of the competition between innovations
have highlighted the influence of switching costs and interaction networks,
but the problem is still puzzling. We introduce a model that reveals a novel
multi-percolation process, which governs the struggle of innovations trying
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to penetrate a market. We find that innovations thrive as long as they
percolate in a population, and one becomes dominant when it is the only
one that percolates. Besides offering a theoretical framework to understand
the diffusion of competing innovations in social networks, our results are
also relevant to model other problems such as opinion formation, political
polarization, survival of languages and the spread of health behavior.
The analysis of percolation in random media has become a very popular framework over
the last decades to address a wide variety of phenomena in disordered systems, such as oil
mining in porous reservoirs, fire spreading in forests, fracture patterns in rocks, electromag-
netic properties of composite materials, etc [1]. More recently, it has also been applied to
shed light on social phenomena, namely the diffusion of opinions [2] and innovations [3] in
social networks. All of the aforementioned systems can be modeled as percolation problems.
More precisely, they can be abstracted as a network of nodes representing the topology of
the random medium, wherein nodes can be either “empty” or “occupied”, depending on the
state of their neighbors. Starting from an initial condition where some nodes are occupied, an
occupied node becomes empty if the number of its occupied neighbors goes below a thresh-
old k, the index of the percolation process (k = 2 for standard percolation [4] and k ≥ 3
for bootstrap or k-core percolation [5, 6]). The underlying switching dynamics is therefore
assumed to be unidirectional.
Here we introduce a percolation model that generalizes this powerful theoretical approach.
Our extension assumes that nodes are of two types A or B, and that a node changes type
when the number of neighbors of the same type is less than k. Consequently both changes
2
A-to-B and B-to-A are possible, i.e. we are considering a bi-directional percolation dynamics
instead. Figure 1 provides an example which illustrates the fundamental difference between
both percolation processes.
The problem we want to address is the competition between innovations [7]. Competition
between products, tools or technical standards is ubiquitous. Well-known examples are rail-
way gauges, keyboard layouts, computer operating systems, high-definition video standards,
e-book readers, etc. The reasons that determine the outcome of these fierce competitions
have puzzled researchers of different disciplines for a long time [8, 9]. Previous work has
highlighted the combined influence of intrinsic benefits of each option together with costs
incurred due to switching [10]. In addition, it has been suggested that social structure, i.e.
the network of social relationships in a group or population, would play a crucial role [11].
So far, however, there has been little analytical work that elucidates the outcome of such
competitions. In this work we show that the competition between innovations can be un-
derstood as a bi-directional percolation process, which ultimately determines the fate of the
options in contest.
To start with, let us consider a simple model with two competing options, A and B (for
example Blu-ray Disc vs HD DVD), whose benefits to individuals depend on intrinsic factors
as well as on the acceptance by others in a certain social neighborhood. This can be modeled
as a coordination problem [12, 13], in which individuals choosing one of the two options A or
B obtain a payoff piA = qx˜A and piB = (1− q)x˜B respectively. The relative advantage of one
option over the other is represented by the parameter q, where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Quantities x˜A and
x˜B give, respectively, the proportion of people adhering to option A or B among the social
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acquaintances who have an influence on the individual’s decision, such us family members,
friends, co-workers, etc (x˜A + x˜B = 1 for every individual). In addition, we consider that
changing option entails some switching cost, which is called cA for a follower of option A who
changes to B, and cB in the opposite case. Thus, A- and B-individuals have the following
effective payoff matrices
A :


q 0
−cA 1− q − cA

 B :


q − cB −cB
0 1− q

 , (1)
where we follow the standard convention for symmetric games: rows represent own strategy
and columns that of the interaction partner.
For the moment, we assume that individuals are able to assess to a good extent the
benefits and drawbacks of options A and B, and also the degree of penetration of each option
in their social neighborhood, i.e. we assume a low level of uncertainty in the decision-making
process (more on this important point later). Therefore, individuals choose a best response
to the current state of their social context according to the payoffs expected from Eq. (1). As
a consequence, A-individuals change to option B if the proportion of A-neighbors is below a
certain threshold, namely x˜A < 1 − q − cA, while B-individuals switch if the proportion of
B-neighbors is less than certain value, x˜B < q − cB.
This defines an evolutionary game [14, 15], which consists in a dynamical system with
state variable x, the global density of the followers of one of the options. We set x = xB
without loss of generality. Disregarding the effect of social structure for the moment, the
evolution of xB can easily be calculated assuming a well-mixed population [16], equivalent
to the mean field hypothesis in physics or the representative agent in economics. It posits
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that every individual has, in her social neighborhood, a proportion of A- or B-individuals
equal to the respective global densities, i.e. for every individual and at any time x˜B = xB.
Under this assumption, the population rapidly reaches an equilibrium with stationary value
x∗B = limt→∞ xB(t)
x∗B =


0, if x0B < q − cB,
x0B, if q − cB ≤ x
0
B ≤ q + cA,
1, if x0B > q + cA,
(2)
where x0B represents the initial density of individuals following option B. Equation (2) shows
that under well-mixed conditions switching costs induce the appearance of a heterogeneous
state, in which both competing options keep a share of the population. If costs are left out
(cA = cB = 0), then we find the standard solution of a coordination game, with an unstable
equilibrium at x∗B = x
0
B, which separates the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria
x∗B = 0 and x
∗
B = 1 [17].
Let us now consider this model embedded in a social network [18, 19], that is, in a network
of social relationships which determines who interacts with whom [14, 20, 21]. Here we use
regular random networks [22], which are networks where nodes are linked at random and
where each node has the same number of neighbors, or degree, z. Such networks are known
to have the most neutral effect on evolutionary games [23], just fixing neighborhood size
and preserving the social context of individuals. They avoid particular effects that some
topological features, such as clustering or degree heterogeneity, may have [24], which could
obscure the processes we want to reveal here.
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Figure 2 displays simulation results for this model, showing the stationary density of
B-individuals x∗B as a function of their initial density x
0
B (see the Materials and Methods
section for full details about the simulations). Notably, there are large differences to mean
field theory, which predicts a heterogeneous population for a much wider range of initial
conditions. In order to understand this deviation we have to consider the time evolution
of the model. To that purpose, it is better to start with a simpler case, setting one of the
switching costs with so large a value that it prevents the switching of individuals following that
strategy. For example, let us set cA ≥ 1− q, so that only B-individuals can change to option
A. This switching takes place when the proportion of B-individuals in the neighborhood of
the focal individual satisfies x˜B < q − cB. Hence the subsequent dynamics exactly coincides
with the pruning of nodes of a standard site percolation process with unidirectional dynamics
(see Fig. 1), A- and B-individuals corresponding to empty and occupied nodes, respectively.
When B-nodes become A-nodes, they leave other B-nodes with fewer B-neighbors. The
process repeats until it stabilizes to a subset of B-nodes, all of which have (q − cB) or more
B-neighbors. When the size of this subset is a non-negligible fraction of the size of the full
graph, or infinite in the case of infinite graphs, then percolation is said to occur [4]. The
appearance of a percolating cluster constitutes a phase transition, and it takes place when
the initial density of occupied nodes is larger than a critical density. In our case, the index
of the percolation process of B-individuals switching to option A, called kB, is given by
kB = ⌈z(q − cB)⌉. (3)
Herein, ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer equal or larger than x. Conversely, considering only
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the transitions of A-individuals to option B, we have another percolation process with index
kA, whose value is given by
kA = ⌈z(1 − q − cA)⌉. (4)
Note that k = 0 and k = 1 are degenerate cases, whereas k = 2 is the index of standard
percolation and k ≥ 3 corresponds to bootstrap or k-core percolation.
The actual dynamics of our model is given by the competition between these two perco-
lation processes. The dynamics is therefore bi-directional, with both transitions A-to-B and
B-to-A taking place simultaneously. A calculation based on standard unidirectional percola-
tion, applied to each process separately, estimates the percolation thresholds only poorly, as
the arrows in Fig. 2 show. It is also possible, however, to take into account the interference
between both processes, with a recursive calculation on the switching times of individuals.
Figure 2 shows the excellent agreement of this calculation with the computer simulations,
and it clearly demonstrates that mutual interference between both percolation processes oc-
curs. Interestingly, we find that this interplay supports the success of the dominated option,
i.e. it allows some individuals following the minor option to percolate with initial conditions
for which unidirectional percolation does not occur (range 0.36 . x0B . 0.38 for option B,
and range 0.62 . x0B . 0.64 for option A). Individuals who have switched obviously promote
percolation of the newly acquired option, as the switching increases the density of that option
in the neighborhoods of adjacent nodes. The time scale of switching for the major option
is much faster than for the minor one [25]. This implies that the pruning of nodes for the
major option is virtually done by the time the pruning of the minor option proceeds, with
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the consequence that only changes of major to minor option have time to effectively foster
percolation of the latter option. More importantly, this analytical theory confirms that the
competition between options A and B gives rise to a bi-directional percolation process, which
allows a simple rationale for the outcome: In the context of competing innovations, perco-
lation of an option means survival and, as long as it is the only one that percolates, it also
implies dominance of the market. We refer the reader to Supporting Information for details
of the analytical calculations and further discussion.
The joint influence of switching costs and social networks becomes most salient when
one of the options is intrinsically superior to the other, i.e. when q 6= 0.5. Figure 3 shows
an example, displaying again the asymptotic density of B-individuals x∗B as a function of
their initial density x0B (see solid line and black squares). In this case, the asymmetry of the
game results in different percolation indices for each option, namely kA = 4 and kB = 1 (see
Eqs. (3)–(4)), which causes a continuous transition towards an A-dominated population (x0B .
0.1), but a discontinuous one in the B-dominated case (x0B & 0.2). The difference between
both transitions [26] originates from the characteristic transition of standard percolation, in
the former case, versus that of bootstrap percolation, in the latter. Interestingly, the net
effect of this imbalance between the two competing percolation processes is a fostering of the
superior option B. Note that if the same game, with or without switching costs, took place
on a well-mixed population, a symmetric outcome around x0B = q = 0.25 would result instead
(see Eq. (2) and dashed red line in Fig. 3).
Let us finally address the issue of uncertainty or noise in the decision rule of individuals.
To this end, we assume that individuals choose options stochastically, with a probability
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that follows a multi-nomial logit model [27, 28], which is also known in physics as Fermi rule
[29, 30]. Specifically, if the expected variation in payoff resulting from a change of option is
∆pi, then the probability of switching strategy is assumed to be 1/(1 + exp(−∆pi/T )). The
parameter T determines the amount of noise in the decision process. In the limit T → 0,
noise disappears and we have the deterministic dynamics used so far. Additional curves
in Fig. 3 display the influence of noise, showing that the qualitative behavior of the model
remains the same for low to moderate amounts of noise. It is striking, however, that the
evolution of the population is biased towards the superior option B, i.e. noise reinforces the
imbalance between options rather than washing it out.
In conclusion, we have shown that the competition between several options gives rise
to bi-directional (or, more generally, multi-directional) percolation processes which can be
analytically understood. Multi-percolation thus provides a powerful theoretical tool to un-
derstand the problem of competition between innovations in networks. It offers predictions
about the survival and dominance of the options in contest, as well as insights into their
dynamical evolution in time. Our general finding is that percolation of an option implies its
survival and, if only one option percolates, it will be eventually supported by everyone. The
latter may be favorable, for example when it promotes a shared technical standard. Never-
theless, it could also create monopolies or endanger pluralism. Our conclusions are expected
to be also relevant to the results of marketing and political campaigns, and to the diffusion
of opinions [11] and behavior [31]. Model variants or extensions may also describe the spread
of health behavior, such as obesity, smoking, depression or happiness [32]. We recognize that
the practical applicability of this theory requires a good knowledge of the social network and
9
a sound modeling of the decision making process of individuals [33], but with the emergent
availability of massive social data and information technologies, we envisage that this goal
will be attainable soon.
Methods Summary: Computer Simulations
All the simulation results reported in the main text have been obtained according to the
procedures described in the following. Population size is 104 individuals. Regular random
networks are generated by randomly assigning links between nodes, ensuring that each node
ends up with exactly the same number of links. Results have been obtained with synchronous
update. This means that, first, the next strategy is calculated for all individuals and, then, it
is updated for them all at once. We have also checked the influence of asynchronous update,
which assigns next strategies to individuals proceeding one by one in random order, but
we have found no significant qualitative difference in the results. The times of convergence
allowed for the population to reach a stationary state are 102 steps for the main model (best
response rule) and 103 steps for the model with noise (multi-nomial logit or Fermi decision
rule). We have verified that these are sufficiently large values. In the first case, population
reaches a frozen state and, in the second one, results do not change if a time of convergence
104 steps is used instead. Results plotted in the graphs correspond, for each data point,
to an average of 100 realizations. Each realization is carried out with a newly generated
random network, where strategies were randomly assigned to individuals in accordance with
the initial densities of both strategies.
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Figure 1: Comparison of unidirectional (panels A–C) vs bi-directional percolation (panels
D–F). In unidirectional percolation, occupied nodes (in black) become empty (in white)
when they have less than k occupied neighbors (in this example k = 2). In the end there
is no occupied node that survives the percolation pruning. With bi-directional percolation,
both white and black nodes switch color when they have less than k = 2 neighbors of their
same color. The end result in this case is an all-black graph, with no white nodes surviving
the competitive bi-directional percolation process. All black nodes end up with two black
neighbors and they are connected, hence they form a percolating cluster. Notice that although
both cases have the same initial condition and percolation index k, the outcome is opposite.
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Figure 2: The fate of two options in contest is determined by the underlying process of multi-
percolation, taking place on the social network. The graph shows the stationary density of
B-individuals x∗ as a function of the initial density x0 (simulation results, black squares).
Parameter q = 0.5, so both options A and B are intrinsically equally good. Switching costs
are also symmetric, with values cA = cB = 0.25. As a result, both percolation indices have the
same value kA = kB = 3. Interactions take place in a regular random network of degree z = 9.
The difference with the prediction of mean theory (dashed line) demonstrates the crucial role
played by the social network. Labels indicate the possible regions of behavior, depending
on the percolation of one option, the other or both. Notice that a heterogeneous population
is sustainable only when both options percolate, but this case occurs for a significant range
of initial conditions. Small arrows near abscissa axes mark the critical density to attain
percolation of each strategy, as predicted by a calculation based on standard unidirectional
percolation. The discrepancy with simulation results highlights the fact that the mutual
interference between both percolation processes changes the percolation thresholds. This is
confirmed by an analytical calculation that takes into account this interplay (solid line).
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Figure 3: Noise only has an effect on the multi-percolation process when the amount is
large. The graph shows the stationary density of B-individuals x∗ as a function of the initial
density x0, for different amounts of uncertainty or noise in the decision rule of individuals
(simulation results, see lines, colors and symbols in legend). Compared to Fig. 2, in this
case q = 0.25, so option B is superior to option A. Switching costs are equal for both
options, with values cA = cB = 0.2. The social network is a regular random network of
degree z = 6. For T = 0 (no noise), the asymmetry in intrinsic value between the options
translates into different percolation indices, kA = 4 and kB = 1, which causes different kinds
of transitions to homogeneous population (A- or B-dominated). This fact favors option B
compared to the mean field prediction. Additional curves show results for non-zero amounts
of noise. Moderate noise does not change the result qualitatively and, strikingly, larger
amounts reinforce the superior option B rather than yielding an more balanced outcome.
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Supplementary Information: Analytical Theory
We study a coordination a game with switching costs. A-individuals have the following payoff
matrix 

q 0
−cA 1− q − cA

 , (5)
while B-individuals have 

q − cB −cB
0 1− q

 . (6)
All three parameters verify q, cA, cB ∈ [0, 1].
We call xt the global density of B-individuals in the population at time step t, x0 its
initial value and x∗ its asymptotic value (x∗ = limt→∞ x
t). At time t = 0 individuals are
randomly assigned options A or B, with probabilities x0A = (1− x
0) or x0B = x
0 respectively.
Given an individual i, we call x˜i the proportion of B-individuals in her neighborhood. Then,
an A-individual i changes to option B when her neighborhood verifies
x˜i > q + cA, (7)
whereas a B-individual j switches strategy when
x˜j < q − cB. (8)
The above strategy switchings correspond to the pruning of nodes of two competing site
percolation processes, whose indices are respectively
kA = ⌈z(1 − q − cA)⌉ (9)
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and
kB = ⌈z(q − cB)⌉, (10)
wherein ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer equal or larger than x.
In the pruning of nodes associated with a site percolation process, the nodes that remain in
the stationary state are those which have k or more neighbors of the same strategy and hence
they belong to a percolating cluster of that strategy. We call pA and pB the probabilities that
a node belongs to a percolating cluster assuming an independent percolation process with
transitions A→ B and B→ A respectively. Obviously, pA ≤ xA = 1− x
0 and pB ≤ xB = x
0.
Both probabilities can be calculated for infinite Bethe lattices [5, 6]. They offer a rough
approximation of the behavior of the model, assuming no interference between both processes,
which yields the following prediction for the asymptotic density of B-individuals
x∗ = 1− x0 + pB − pA. (11)
This approximation obviously fails to account for the change in the percolation probabili-
ties that the simulation results reflect. Therefore, we propose the following analytical theory,
which takes into account the interplay between both competing percolation processes.
Let us first define a simplified version of the model, which we call the 1T-model. This
model is the same as the original one, with the only difference that each node can only switch
strategy once. That is, nodes change strategy according to Eqs. (7)–(8), but once they have
changed, they stick to the new strategy, no matter what Eqs. (7)–(8) dictate. Note that this
idea can be generalized to a nT-model, where each node is allowed to switch at most n times.
Our original model could also be called ∞T-model, i.e. when n is unbounded.
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In fact, we can assume in the original model that most nodes will switch only once or
never. For a node to switch, it is required that the number of neighbors of the same strategy
is below a given threshold k. Once it has switched, it will have a number of neighbors of
the (new) strategy larger than z− k (z is the degree of the network), which usually means a
large number of them. So it is reasonable to expect that the node will be locked in the new
strategy forever, as it would require a large number of changes in its neighborhood to switch
back. The great similarity between the simulation results of the original ∞T-model and the
1T-model supports this intuition (see Fig. 4–7).
The 1T-model can be exactly calculated for an infinite Bethe lattice, with a recursive
procedure that we present in the following. From now on, let us denote by X one of the
options, A or B, and by Y the other one, i.e. Y is the only element of the set {A,B} − {X}.
The index of the percolation process with transitionsX → Y is denoted kX . The fundamental
recursive property of the 1T-model is that the time of switching of any X-node is 1+ (the
kX-th greater time of switching among its X-neighbors). For example, with a percolation
process for transitions B → A with index kB = 3, if a B-node has 6 neighbors that are all
B-nodes and whose times of switching are t = 2, 2, 3, 5, 7, 7, respectively, then the node will
switch at time t = 6. Notice that if an X-node belongs to a percolating cluster then its time
of switching is unbounded, because it has kX or more neighbors that also have unbounded
switching times.
First, we calculate the switching probabilities of a node, conditioned to the event of being
connected to a node of the same or the other type. Thus, we define rtX as the probability of
a node being of type X and switching at time t, conditioned to the event of being connected
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to an X-node until time t − 1, with t ≥ 1. Similarly, we define stX as the probability of a
node being of type X and switching at time t, conditioned to the event of being connected
to a Y -node, i.e. of the opposite type, until time t− 1, with t ≥ 1.
Second, we calculate the probabilities of a node being of type X and switching at time t,
which we denote ptX , given the conditional probabilities of switching of its child nodes until
time t− 1, namely r1X , . . . , r
t−1
X and s
1
Y , . . . , s
t−1
Y .
Third, in the stationary state X-nodes will be either nodes that have being X-nodes since
the beginning or initial Y -nodes that have switched option. Hence the stationary density of
B-nodes x∗ can be expressed as
x∗ = x0 −
∞∑
t=1
ptB +
∞∑
t=1
ptA. (12)
To calculate the probabilities {rtA, s
t
A, p
t
A, r
t
B, s
t
B, p
t
B} we need to consider all the possible
configurations of neighborhood of a node. To this end, we classify the neighbors at time t
into one of these types:
[1] Nodes of the same type that switch at time t− 1.
[2] Nodes of the same type that switch at time t or later.
[3] Nodes of the same type that switch at time t− 2 or before.
[4] Nodes of the other type that switch at time t or later.
[5] Nodes of the other type that switch at time t− 1 or before.
Note that neighbors of type [1] are the ones that trigger switching of the focal node at time
t. For a given configuration, the number of neighbors of each type appears as an exponent in
the corresponding combinatorial expression. In Eqs. (13)–(21) below, we use the exponents
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i, j, k,m, n for types [1] to [5], respectively,
In addition, we define R0X = S
0
X = 0, and R
t
X =
∑t
τ=1 r
τ
X and S
t
X =
∑t
τ=1 s
τ
X , for t ≥ 1.
The degree of the Bethe lattice is z. The calculation proceeds according to the following
Eqs. (13)–(21)
r1X =
kX−2∑
j=0
(
z − 1
j
)
(x0X)
j+1 (x0Y )
z−1−j , (13)
s1X =
kX−1∑
j=0
(
z − 1
j
)
(x0X)
j+1 (x0Y )
z−1−j . (14)
For t > 1
rtX = x
0
X
∑
(i,j,k,m,n)∈R
(
z − 1
i, j, k,m, n
)
(rt−1X )
i (x0X − R
t−1
X )
j (Rt−2X )
k (x0Y − S
t−1
Y )
m (St−1Y )
n , (15)
stX = x
0
X
∑
(i,j,k,m,n)∈S
(
z − 1
i, j, k,m, n
)
(rt−1X )
i (x0X − R
t−1
X )
j (Rt−2X )
k (x0Y − S
t−1
Y )
m (St−1Y )
n , (16)
where the sets of exponents R and S are
R = { (i, j, k,m, n) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , z − 1}5 : i+ j + k +m+ n = z − 1,
i+ j + k ≥ kX − 1,
i+ j + n ≥ kX − 1,
j + n ≤ kX − 2 }, (17)
S = { (i, j, k,m, n) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , z − 1}5 : i+ j + k +m+ n = z − 1,
i+ j + k ≥ kX ,
i+ j + n ≥ kX ,
j + n ≤ kX − 1 }. (18)
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p1X =
kX−1∑
j=0
(
z
j
)
(x0X)
j+1 (x0Y )
z−j . (19)
For t > 1
ptX = x
0
X
∑
(i,j,k,m,n)∈P
(
z
i, j, k,m, n
)
(rt−1X )
i (x0X − R
t−1
X )
j (Rt−2X )
k (x0Y − S
t−1
Y )
m (St−1Y )
n , (20)
where the set of exponents P is
P = { (i, j, k,m, n) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , z}5 : i+ j + k +m+ n = z,
i+ j + k ≥ kX ,
i+ j + n ≥ kX ,
j + n ≤ kX − 1 }. (21)
As the probabilities of switching decay exponentially with time, it is enough to calculate a
finite number of terms in the sums of Eq. (12). For the results reported in this work 100 terms
were used, which gives excellent agreement with the computer simulations (see Figs. 4–7).
Notice that Eqs. (15)–(18) assume that nodes of the other strategy that have switched
(exponent n) have done so before or at the same time that those of the own strategy (exponent
k). This simplification thus avoids considering the full set of possible histories of switchings
in times previous to t−1. This assumption is based on the separation of time scales between
the switchings of both percolation processes. For unidirectional percolation, the probability
of a node switching at time t decreases exponentially with the difference between the initial
density and the critical percolation density. That is, the nearer the systems starts to the
percolation threshold the slower the pruning of nodes is [25]. As a consequence, with bi-
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directional percolation, when an option is near its percolation threshold the other is well
beyond it, so the switching of the latter will be exponentially faster, which supports the
assumption above.
It is interesting to point out that the proposed recursive scheme on the switching times can
be modified to carry out a calculation disregarding interference, thus equivalent to Eq. (11).
The modification consists in setting stX = 0, for any t ≥ 1, instead of Eqs. (14) and (16).
Figures 4 and 5 show the results presented in Figs. 2 and 3 of the main text, but this time
including also the simulation results for the 1T-model and the analytical results obtained
with the calculation without interference. These figures show the close similarity between
the original model and the 1T-model, which confirms that most nodes that switch in the
original model do so only once. They also demonstrate the high accuracy of the proposed
approximation, as compared to the calculation neglecting interference, which fails to reflect
the actual percolation thresholds properly. Figures 6 and 7 display two additional examples.
Finally, we want to point out that, strictly speaking, the networks considered in the ana-
lytical calculations (namely, infinite Bethe lattices) differ from the ones used in the computer
simulations (finite regular random networks). Apart from the different size, in the former
case there are no closed paths or loops, whereas in the latter there exists a (low) number of
them. Figures 4–7 show, however, that these differences in network topology do not produce
a significative discrepancy between computational and analytical results.
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Figure 4: Asymptotic density of B-nodes x∗ as a function of the initial density x0. The model
parameters are the same as in Fig. 2 of the main text: game q = 0.5, costs cA = cB = 0.25,
network degree z = 9. The corresponding indices of the percolation processes are kA = kB =
3.
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Figure 5: Asymptotic density of B-nodes x∗ as a function of the initial density x0. The model
parameters are the same as in Fig. 3 of the main text: game q = 0.25, costs cA = cB = 0.2,
network degree z = 6. The corresponding indices of the percolation processes are kA = 4,
kB = 1.
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Figure 6: Asymptotic density of B-nodes x∗ as a function of the initial density x0. Model
parameters are: game q = 0.5, costs cA = cB = 0.2, network degree z = 11. The indices of
the percolation processes are kA = kB = 4.
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Figure 7: Asymptotic density of B-nodes x∗ as a function of the initial density x0. Models
parameters are: game q = 0.3, costs cA = cB = 0.2, network degree z = 6. The indices of the
percolation processes are kA = 3, kB = 1.
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